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Business Associations
by Crystal J. Clark*
and Kristi K. North**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys notable cases in the areas of corporate, limited
liability company, partnership, agency, and joint-venture law decided
between June 1, 2013 and May 31, 2014 by the Georgia Supreme Court,
the Georgia Court of Appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, and the United States district courts located in
Georgia.1
II.

ISSUES OF FIRST IMPRESSION

A.

QuestionedApplication of the Business Judgment Rule
During this survey period, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit each certified questions to the Georgia Supreme
Court regarding whether the business judgment rule precludes ordinary
negligence claims against bank officers and directors. In FDIC v.
Loudermilk,2 the district court acknowledged that other federal courts
* Associate in the firm of McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
Appalachian State University (B.A., summa curn laude, 2003); Mercer University, Walter

F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2009). Member, Mercer Law Review
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Institute of Technology (B.S., summa curn laude, 2008); Emory University School of Law
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1. For an analysis of Georgia business associations law during the prior survey period,
see Crystal J. Clark, Business Associations,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L.
REV. 55 (2013).
2. 984 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
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in the district "have uniformly applied the business judgment rule to
protect bank officers and directors," but it "respectfully disagree[d]. "'
The court pointed to policy reasons to explain why the business
judgment rule should not be applied to bank officers and directors sued
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).4
The court also cited section 7-1-490 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 5 which sets forth "the ordinary negligence
standard of care applicable to bank officers and directors." As a result,
the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and certified the
unsettled issue of law to the Georgia Supreme Court.7
In FDIC v. Skow,5 the Eleventh Circuit also questioned the interaction of the business judgment rule with O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490.9 With "no
clear controlling precedent from the Supreme Court of Georgia," the
court certified its questions to the Georgia Supreme Court.10 The
supreme court heard oral arguments in connection with the certified
questions from Loudermilk on April 21, 2014, and Skow on May 19,
2014.11 The impact of the court's decision could be quite far reaching.
In addition to impacting the potential liability of Georgia's bank officers
and directors, it is likely to have implications for the liability of other
officers and directors as well.

3. Id. at 1358-59.
4. Id. at 1359. Unlike a corporation, the monetary loss for a failed bank is ultimately
borne by taxpayers and "echo[es] throughout the local and national economy." Id.
5. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490 (2004).
6. Loudermilk, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 1359; see also O.C.G.A. § 7-1-490 ("Directors and
officers of a bank or trust company shall discharge the duties of their respective positions
in good faith and with that diligence, care, and skill which ordinary prudent men would
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.").
7. Loudermilk, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
8. 741 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2013).
9. Id. at 1346.
10. Id. at 1346-47 (certifying, "(1) Does a bank director or officer violate... O.C.GA
§ 7-1-490 when he acts in good faith but fails to act with 'ordinary diligence'.. " and "(2)

...
can the bank officer or director defendants be held individually liable if they ...are

shown to have been ordinarily negligent or to have breached a fiduciary duty, based on
ordinary negligence in performing professional duties?").
11. ComputerizedDocketing System and Case Types: CaseNumber S14QO454, SUPREME
COURT OF GEORGIA, http://www.gasupreme.us/docketsearch/results-one-record.php?case

Number=S14Q0454 (last visited Aug. 26, 2014); Computerized DocketingSystem and Case
Types: Case Number S14Q0623, SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA, httpJ/www.gasupreme.us/

docketsearch/resultsonerecord.phpcaseNumber=S4Q623 (last visited Aug. 26,2014).
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Application of Attorney-Client Privilege

For the first time, the supreme court addressed the parameters of
attorney-client privilege in the context of communications between a law
firm and its in-house counsel in a legal malpractice lawsuit. 12 In St.
Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter,Maclean, Exley & Dunn, PC.,'a St.
Simons Waterfront, LLC (SSW) sued Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn,
P.C. (Hunter Maclean), alleging legal malpractice stemming from Hunter
Maclean's representation of SSW in a commercial real estate venture.
When Hunter Maclean learned that it might be sued by SSW, it
informed its in-house general counsel about the potential lawsuit. The
in-house general counsel interviewed the attorneys who had been
involved in the representation of SSW At the same time, Hunter
14
Maclean continued to represent SSW in real estate closings.
After SSW brought suit, it sought the production of communications
between Hunter Maclean and its in-house general counsel. The trial
court held that any privilege the communications might have had was
nullified due to the conflict of interest that had developed between
Hunter Maclean and SSW' 5 According to the trial court, a conflict of
interest existed because Hunter Maclean had "engaged in efforts to
defend itself against SSW while simultaneously continuing to represent
SSW, without advising SSW of the conflict."" The trial court concluded
that "the conflict between the involved attorneys and SSW must be
imputed to [the in-house general counsel] under Rule 1.10 of the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct; and that any privilege within the firm
was negated by this conflict of interest." 7
The Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed other jurisdictions' approaches
to the issue and then developed its own framework in which to analyze
the case. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 8 In considering the issue, the court determined that the best approach is "to analyze
the privilege issue ... as we would in any other lawsuit in which the
privilege is asserted." 9 Accordingly, the court stated that attorney-

12. See St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga.
419, 422, 746 S.E.2d 98, 104 (2013).
13. 293 Ga. 419, 746 S.E.2d 98 (2013).
14. Id. at 420, 746 S.E.2d at 102.
15. Id. at 421, 746 S.E.2d at 103.
16. Id.
17. Id.; see also GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2001).
18. 293 Ga. at 419, 421, 746 S.E.2d at 102, 103.
19. Id. at 423, 746 S.E.2d at 104. Likewise, the court determined that in the law firm
in-house general counsel context, the attorney work product doctrine should also be
analyzed "using the standard rules that govern the doctrine in other contexts." Id. at 429,
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client privilege attaches in the in-house general counsel context when
"(1) there is an attorney-client relationship; (2) the communications in
question relate to matters on which legal advice was sought; (3) the
communications have been maintained in confidence; and (4) no
exceptions to privilege are applicable."2 °
For the first requirement-establishing an attorney-client relationship-the court stated that a law firm must, as a factual matter,
establish that "the firm's in-house counsel was actually acting in that
21
capacity with regard to anticipated legal action against the firm." To
establish an attorney-client relationship in the in-house general counsel
context, law firms should consider (1) adopting billing procedures that
reflect that the firm itself is a client; (2) maintaining a separate file for
communications pertaining to the representation; and (3) maintaining
a full-time general counsel.22 Disagreeing with the trial court's holding
that the conflict of interest impacted the attorney-client privilege
determination, the court opined that "the potential existence of an
imputed conflict of interest between in-house counsel and the firm client
is not a persuasive basis for abrogating the attorney-client privilege
23
between in-house counsel and the firm's attorneys."
Regarding the second requirement-that the communications relate to
the purpose for which legal advice was sought-discussions with in-house
counsel should involve "matters within the scope of the attorneys'
Regarding the third requirement-that
employment with the firm."
the communications remain confidential-only attorneys associated with
the case at issue should be involved in the communications with the inhouse counsel.25
Finally, to establish the attorney-client privilege, there must not be an
In this regard, the court
applicable exception to the privilege.26
in the law firm in-house
exception
duty"
a
"fiduciary
declined to adopt
27
that the attorney's
notion
"the
rejected
court
The
context.
counsel

746 S.E.2d at 108.
20. Id. at 423, 746 S.E.2d at 104 (citations omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 424, 746 S.E.2d at 105.
23. Id. at 425-26, 746 S.E.2d at 105-06.
24. Id. at 426, 746 S.E.2d at 106.
25. Id. at 427, 746 S.E.2d at 107.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 428-29, 746 S.E.2d at 107-08. Fiduciary duty exceptions prohibit persons
acting in a fiduciary capacity from asserting the privilege to shield their "communications
with counsel from the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship." Id. at 427, 746 S.E.2d at
107.
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duty of loyalty [to his or her client] should automatically trump the
privilege."2
Law firms now have specific guidance with respect to preserving the
attorney-client privilege in connection with communications with their
own in-house general counsels.
III.
A.

NOTEWORTHY CASES

Stock Transfer Restrictions

In Mossy Dell, Inc. v. AB&T National Bank (In re Beauchamp),29 the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia held that
the stock-transfer restrictions listed under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-627(d)" are
exhaustive, and any transfer restrictions not consistent with this statute
are impermissible.3 1 In In re Beauchamp, a corporation's articles of
incorporation prohibited the transfer of any shares for a period of ten
years. Once the ten-year period had expired, the corporation's shares
could only be transferred to the shareholders' lineal descendants. A
creditor of one of the shareholders obtained a judgment against the
shareholder, whereby his shares were confiscated and sold at a public
sale to that creditor. As purchaser of the shares, the creditor demanded
that the corporation issue a new stock certificate recognizing the
purchaser as the owner of the shares. This lawsuit ensued.3 2
Based on a plain language interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 14-2-627(d), the
district court determined that (1) "subsection (d) lists the permissible
mechanisms that may be used by a transfer restriction" and (2) "all
mechanisms not listed are impermissible."3 3 In applying the statute to
the case at hand, the court determined that the ten-year transfer
restriction was unreasonable, did not fit within one of the categories set
forth in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-627(d), and was unenforceable.34

28. Id. at 429, 746 S.E.2d at 108.
29. 500 B.R. 235 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2013).
30. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-627(d) (2003).

31. In re Beauchamp, 500 B.R. at 242.
32. Id. at 238.
33. Id. at 242.
34. Id. Factors relevant to determining the reasonableness of a transfer restriction
include: (1) "the size of the corporation," (2) "the degree of restraint upon alienation," (3)
"the time the restriction is to continue in effect," (4) "the method to be used in determining
the transfer price of shares," (5) "the likelihood of the restriction's contributing to the
attainment of corporate objectives," (6) "the possibility that a hostile shareholder might
injure the corporation," and (7) "the probability of the restriction's promoting the best
interests of the corporation." Id. at 244.
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With respect to the family-related transfer restriction, the court
determined that it was an acceptable mechanism for restricting transfers
because it fit within O.C.G.A. § 14-2-627(dX4), which permits prohibiting
"transfer of the restricted shares to designated persons or classes of
persons."" The court noted that O.C.G.A. § 14-2-627(d)(4) does not
require a corporation to provide "an avenue for every shareholder to
realize the value of his or her shares" because such a requirement would
threaten the corporation's ability to restrict transfer to certain persons
or classes of persons.8 6 In sum, stock transfer restrictions must fall
within one of the categories listed under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-627(d).
B.

ClarificationsRegarding Standards of Care
In Rollins v. Rollins,"7 the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
holding of the court of appeals regarding the appropriate standard of
care owed by directors of corporations when such corporations are held
within trusts and such directors are trustees of such trusts." In
Rollins, certain family trusts held a minority interest in corporate family
entities. The trustees were alleged to have engaged in mismanagement
of the trusts. The court of appeals determined that a heightened,
trustee-level fiduciary standard applied to the case at issue. 9
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court stated, "Although
that holding may be appropriate as a general rule, it is inappropriate in
this case both because the cardinal rule in trust law is that the intention
of the settlor is to be followed,

... and

because the trusts hold only a

minority interest in the family entities."'0 With the trusts holding only
a minority interest, it is preferable instead to "allow the trustees to act
in the interest of all the shareholders." 4' Accordingly, the court applied
a deferential standard, holding that a trustee's corporate duties and
actions should be held to a corporate-level fiduciary standard when a
trustee of a trust, which holds a minority interest
in a corporate entity,
42
is also a director of such a corporate entity.

35. Id. at 245 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-627(d)(4)). The family-related transfer
restriction prohibits the transfer to a designated class of persons-any class of persons who
are not the shareholders' lineal descendants. Id.
36. Id.
37. 294 Ga. 711, 755 S.E.2d 727 (2014). Last year's Article discussed the holding and
analysis of the appellate court for this case. See Clark, supra note 1, at 55-56.
38. Rollins, 294 Ga. at 712, 755 S.E.2d at 729.
39. Id. at 711-12, 755 S.E.2d at 729.
40. Id. at 714, 755 S.E.2d at 730 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 715, 755 S.E.2d at 731 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 715-16, 755 S.E.2d at 731.
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C. Clarifying the Reach of a Non-competition Clause
In Primary Investments, LLC v. Wee Tender Care III, Inc.,4 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that the non-competition clause in an
asset-purchase agreement (APA) did not apply to the members of a
limited liability company when the APA had only been signed by the
limited liability company, not the individual members." In Primary
Investments, LLC, the Nixons purchased substantially all of the assets
of Primary Investments, LLC (Primary) from the O'Briens through an
APA between Primary, the seller, and N&N Holdings, LLC, the buyer.4
The non-competition clause in the APA stated: "Until three years after
the Closing Date ...Seller agrees that neither Seller nor its agents will,
unless acting in accordance with Buyer's prior written consent,.., open
any child care facility within a ten-mile radius of any Business Locations
being sold to the Buyer hereunder.'"" Within two years, the O'Briens
opened a new childcare facility within the ten-mile radius of Primary.
This suit ensued.47
In determining whether the non-competition clause in the APA applied
to the O'Briens, the court noted that the O'Briens were not a party to
the agreement and did not sign the APA in their individual capacities." Primary had no authority to bind the O'Briens on an individual
basis to the terms of the APA. 9 As such, the court determined that
"merely including the term 'its agents' in a contract signed by a limited
liability company does not bind its members or managers individually.)5 0

In sum, to properly bind a limited liability company's members

or managers, each individual must be made a party to the agreement,
and each must sign in his or her individual capacity."'
D.

Statute of Limitations for PartnershipClaims
In First Benefits, Inc. v. Amalgamated Life Insurance Co.,52 the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia confirmed
Georgia Supreme Court precedent, holding that the statute of limitations

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

323 Ga. App. 196, 746 S.E.2d 823 (2013).
Id. at 201, 746 S.E.2d at 828.
Id. at 196-97, 746 S.E.2d at 826.
Id. at 197, 746 S.E.2d at 826.
Id.
Id. at 198-99, 746 S.E.2d at 827.
Id. at 200, 746 S.E.2d at 828.
Id.
Id.
No. 5:13-CV-37, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110222 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 6, 2013).
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for claims by one partner against another partner does not begin to run
until after dissolution of the partnership. 3 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that "'contemporary' Georgia law holds that
limitations periods on claims between partners run from the breach of
duty."54 Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs' claims were not barred
because four years had not elapsed since the plaintiffs allegedly
terminated the partnership. 5
E.

Determining ProperParties to a Lawsuit

In National City Mortgage Co. v. 21dwell,5 6 the Georgia Supreme
Court reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals and held that a merged
corporation had standing to continue an action that had been brought
against one of the premerger entities.57 In Tidwell, the plaintiffs
originally filed suit against National City Mortgage Company (National
City), which merged with PNC Bank while the lawsuit was pending. No
motion was made to add or substitute PNC Bank, and National City
continued as the named defendant. When PNC Bank, as successor in
interest to National City, attempted to appeal an adverse trial court
of appeals dismissed the appeal, citing PNC Bank's lack
ruling, the court
58
of standing.
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals jurisdictional
decision, holding,
When corporations merge, state law provides that the title to each
corporation's property vests in the surviving corporation without any
conveyance, transfer, or assignment ...and a proceeding pending
against any corporation to the merger may continue as if the merger
did not occur or the surviving corporation may be substituted in the
proceeding.5 9
The court concluded that the claims originally filed by and against
National City could continue because National City and PNC Bank were
deemed to be the same legal entity because of the merger.6 0

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at *10.
Id. at *7-8, *9.
Id. at *8-10.
293 Ga. 697, 749 S.E.2d 730 (2013).
Id. at 700, 701, 749 S.E.2d at 733, 734.
Id. at 697-98, 749 S.E.2d at 731-32.
Id.at 700, 749 S.E.2d at 733.
Id. at 701, 749 S.E.2d at 733-34.
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ContractualInterpretation

In Herren v. Sucher,6 the court of appeals determined that an
agreement to indemnify and hold another harmless "is not synonymous
with an agreement to assume another's liabilities." 2 In Herren, a
plaintiff who suffered a stroke sued the original seller of a dietary
supplement, Barrin Innovations, LLC (Barrin). Barrin argued that it
was not a proper party to the lawsuit, rather the entity that had
purchased Barrin's assets was the proper party. The purchase
agreement by which Barrin sold its assets included an indemnity clause,
but did not include an express statement that the buyer would assume
Barrin's liabilities.6 3 The court opined that, as a general matter, a
Because the express
buyer does not assume a seller's liabilities."
language of the purchase agreement did not contemplate the buyer's
assumption of Barrin's liabilities, although Barrin may eventually have
a right to claim indemnity from the buyer, Barrin was determined to be
a proper party to the lawsuit.6 5
G.

Determining the Independence of Review Committees

In Benfield v. Wells,"6 the court of appeals determined that a
corporation's review committee was independent despite the fact that a
committee member had certain connections to the defendants whom the
committee was investigating." The plaintiff claimed that the review
committee lacked independence because a committee member had
connections with the defendants: one defendant had approved the
committee member's compensation at a previous company, one had
served on a committee with him at another company, and other
defendants were members of various charitable organizations with

61. 325 Ga. App. 219, 750 S.E.2d 430 (2013).
62. Id. at 225, 750 S.E.2d at 435.
63. Id. at 219-20, 225, 750 S.E.2d at 431-32, 435. The indemnity clause stated: "Buyer

shall indemnify and hold harmless Seller from any liability arising from the actions of the
business including but not limited to liabilities incurred, outstanding debts, harm caused
by products and/or machinery owned or produced by the businesses." Id. at 225, 750
S.E.2d at 435.
64. Id. at 224, 750 S.E.2d at 435. Such exceptions include express agreement, merger,
"fraudulent attempt to avoid liabilities," and situations where a buyer is a "mere
continuation of the predecessor corporation." Id (quoting First Support Servs. Inc. v.
Trevino, 288 Ga. App. 850, 852, 655 S.E.2d 627, 630 (2007))..
65. Id. at 226, 750 S.E.2d at 435-36.
66. 324 Ga. App. 85, 749 S.E.2d 384 (2013).
67. Id. at 90, 749 S.E.2d at 388.
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him.6" The court characterized these connections as "business-only"
connections and considered them insufficient to render the committee
member "unable to 'base his decision on the merits of the issue rather
than being governed by extraneous considerations or influences."' 6 9 In
sum, such personal relationships, where a person does not have a
personal interest in the transaction, are insufficient to negate independence.
H. Piercingthe Corporate Veil and Separatenessof Limited Liability
Companies and Corporations
In Insituform Technologies, LLC v. Cosmic TopHat, LLC,7 ° the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
addressed various issues relating to piercing and reverse piercing the
corporate veil of a limited liability company.7 The court reconfirmed
that Georgia 7law
does not support a claim for reverse piercing of the
2
corporate veil.
Under Georgia law,
The failure of a limited liability company to observe formalities relating
to the exercise of its powers or the management of its business and
affairs is not a ground for imposing personal liability on a member,
manager, agent, or employee of the limited liability company for
liabilities of the limited liability company.7"
Likewise, undercapitalization of a limited liability company, in and of
itself, is insufficient to warrant piercing the corporate veil unless it is
"coupled with evidence of an intent at the time of the capitalization to
improperly avoid future debts of the [LLC]." 7 ' This case confirms the
continuation of Georgia's law regarding piercing the corporate veil,
particularly with respect to limited liability companies.

68. Id. at 89, 749 S.E.2d at 388.
69. Id. at 89-90, 749 S.E.2d at 388 (quoting the trial court). The court also noted that
the corporation had met itsburden of proving the independence of the committee via the
following: (1) the extensive report generated by the committee, which included a description
of the review process and an investigation of the committee members' backgrounds and
qualifications regarding their independence; and (2) the affidavits that the committee
members submitted confiming their independence. Id. at 86-87, 749 S.E.2d at 386-87.
70. 959 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
71. Id. at 1344-45.
72. Id. at 1344.
73. O.C.G.A. § 14-11-314 (2003).
74. Insituform Tech&, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (alteration in original) (quoting
Milk v. Total Pay & HR Solutions, Inc., 280 Ga. App. 449,453,634 S.E.2d 208,212 (2006)).
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I.

The Separate Legal Nature of Corporations
In Department of Transportationv. McMeans, 5 the supreme court
reiterated the concept that corporations are separate legal entities,
76
distinct from their shareholders, officers, directors, and employees.
In McMeans, McMeans Leasing, Inc. (MLI) was wholly owned by Brian
McMeans, who also personally owned property leased by MLI. When
condemnation proceedings for the property were initiated, Mr. McMeans
filed certain pleadings, personally alleging both damage to the property
and business loss. The trial court struck the pleading for business loss
claims. The court of appeals reversed, and the supreme court granted
certiorari.77 The supreme court concluded that the trial court had not
erred.78 In its analysis, the court cited the legal separateness of
corporations, which "is so even in the situation in which a corporation
is owned solely by one person." 9 As such, the court determined that
MLI, as lessee of the property, was required to plead the business losses
resulting from the condemnation, not McMean.80

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

294 Ga. 436, 754 S.E.2d 61 (2014).
Id. at 437, 754 S.E.2d at 63.
Id. at 436-37, 754 S.E.2d at 62.
Id. at 438, 754 S.E.2d at 63.
Id. at 437, 754 S.E.2d at 63.
Id. at 438, 754 S.E.2d at 63.

